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ABSTRACT
The impact of ‘authoritarian legacies’ on successor democracies has been
widely researched with reference to every type of non-democratic regime.
However, scant attention has been devoted to hybrid regimes legacies,
despite the growing relevance acquired by these regimes in the last dec-
ades. This paper deals with the legacies of Levitsky and Way’s Competitive
Authoritarian model, evaluating their impact on successor democracies
through an analysis of the Croatian case. The research shows that the
legacies of the Tuđman’s regime significantly affected the Quality of
Democracy in Croatia. The innovative capacity of the former regime and
the continuous nature of the transition explain this relevant impact, only







Since Kirchheimer’s confining conditions (1965), the impact of ‘authoritarian legacies’ on successor
democracies have been widely researched with reference to every type of non-democratic regime.
However, almost no attention has been devoted to hybrid regimes, despite the growing relevance
of this phenomenon. Hence, the main goal of this research is to address this gap with the aim of
attracting the attention of the literature on a topic that deserves greater consideration. Therefore,
we elaborate a general and flexible framework that provides preliminary evidences regarding the
relevant impact hybrid regime legacies may have on successor democracies.
Since it appears to be among the most promising types of hybrid regime, we decide to deal
with Levitsky and Way (L&W)’s Competitive Authoritarian (CA) model (2010). In their analysis, L&W
show how fifteen out of thirty-five CA cases transitioned to democracy by 2008. However, none of
them established a high-quality democracy (Figure 1). Is there a role played by CA legacies in these
processes? What are their consequences for the quality of successor democracies? Which factors
may contribute to explain their role?
Due to the scant attention of the literature, we have found hardly any hypothesis regarding the role of
hybrid regime legacies in democratization processes. The only, partial, exception is represented by
Levitsky and Way (2010), which, in the last chapter of their book on linkage, leverage and the democra-
tization of post-cold war CA regimes, introduce the distinction between rotten-door and hard-door
transitions and identify the organizational power of the incumbent as the main factor explaining the
impact of CA legacies on regime outcomes. According to these authors, only in rotten-door transitions
(low organizational power) legacies of former CAs have a relevant influence on successor regimes. Here,
our goal is twofold. On one hand, we claim that the organizational power of the incumbent is an
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insufficient predictor of the role played by CA legacies in democratization processes. On the other, we aim
at specifying and adding nuances to this hypothesis claiming that if we overcome L&W’s dichotomy
regarding regimes outcomes (democracy/non-democracy) adding theQuality of Democracy (QoD) to the
equation, even in those cases in which L&W consider CA legacies marginal (hard-door transitions) they
actually matter and deserve to be studies because of their impact on the QoD.
To test these claims we examine the Croatian case, which according to L&W’s model should be
among the least affected by CA legacies. If the latter and their influence over the QoD can be
detected in this crucial case then these outcomes may be even more probable in countries with
less favourable conditions. This research contributes to both established and emerging fields of
research. First, the literature on authoritarian regimes and their legacies, with a focus on the CA
model. Second, the broad literature on democratizations, with specific regard to the QoD and the
factors explaining its level. In this regard, the paper may contribute to the debate on the demo-
cratic crisis, which has recently emerged as a key topic in democratization studies (Castaldo 2018a).
The role of the past in democratization studies: a brief overview of the literature on
authoritarian legacies
Kirchheimer already envisaged the role played by autocratic legacies when he argued that the path
toward democracy is affected by confining conditions, namely authoritarian structures, values and
orientations that survived the transition (1965). Since then, the international literature has widely
focused on this topic. In 1982, a book edited by Herz drew the first comprehensive conclusions on
the legacies of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, while the volume edited by Larsen (1998) is
among the most relevant comparative researches on the legacies of Fascism in Europe. Both Linz
and Stepan (1996) and Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) underline the role played by the nature of
previous regimes in the consolidation of democracy, highlighting that totalitarian legacies impose
a greater burden for the development of democratic civil societies than do authoritarian legacies.
Karl and Schmitter (1991) stressed the relevance of two authoritarian legacies: the Guerilla question,


























Figure 1. Post-CA democracies according to the V-DEM Liberal Democracy Index (1989–2017).
Source: V-DEM Dataset available at www.v-dem.net.
Note: Both Freedom House and Polity IV consider Guyana a democratic country since 1993.
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over armed forces, and the Nomenklatura question, more frequent in post-communist democratiza-
tions, regarding the renovation of state structures (i.e. public administration).
The literature focused also on historical legacies related to phenomena preceding autocratic
regimes (i.e. previous experiences with democracy, socio-economic or cultural features) (Pridham
2000). For example, according to Huntington (1991), past democratic experiences make democra-
tizations more likely: institutions, collective actors and individual leaders may constitute ‘carriers’ of
experiences and memories established during the first democratic regime. Recently, Pérez-Liñán
and Mainwaring (2013) tested the same argument for Latin American cases.
Important studies have focused on the role of collective memories, the ‘Politics of the Past,’ and,
in particular, of transitional justice as the way new democracies deal with their authoritarian past
(i.e., former political elites and repressive institutions): the path chosen may affect the legitimation
and quality of successor democracies (Costa Pinto and Morlino 2011; Raimundo 2015).
The role played by the past has been widely researched in post-communist democratizations. In
1992, Jowitt predicted that Leninist legacies would be relevant in Eastern European democratiza-
tions. According to Pop-Eleches (2007), different features of the communist experience, whether
cultural, economic, or political, explain different aspects of democratization in post-communist
countries. Other researches focused on more specific aspects. For example, communist legacies
have affected protest activity (Bernhard and Karakoc 2007), political party development (Grzymala-
Busse 2002), and voting behaviour (Wittenberg 2006).
The main goal of this general, and by no means exhaustive, overview was to show the presence
of an important lacuna in the literature on authoritarian legacies, which dealt with every type of
non-democratic regime but neglected the new hybrid forms of regime that have become
a consolidated reality in the past three decades. Moreover, in the last twenty years many new
democracies emerged from hybrid regimes (i.e. the fifteen cases listed by L&W): hence, it is possible
to analyse the former looking for legacies of the latter, and to assess their impact on the QoD.
Competitive authoritarian legacies and the quality of democracy
According to Hite and Morlino ‘authoritarian legacies encompass all behavioural patterns, rules,
relationships, social and political situations, and also norms, procedures and institutions, either
introduced or strongly and patently strengthened by the immediately preceding authoritarian
regime’ (2004, 26). We should stress that ‘strongly and patently strengthened’ refers to any factor
that the authoritarian regime incorporates in its defining features and/or behaviours, giving new
meanings to elements originated before the regime was established. This broad definition is
adopted because disentangling the impact of authoritarian and historical legacies at the empirical
level is often very complex, and the selection of the Croatian case is helpful in this respect since the
Tuđman’s regime represents a departure from the previous communist political system.
Our goal is here to focus on the impact of hybrid regime legacies on successor democracies. The
reasons to focus on a specific type of hybrid regime (CA) are manifold. The literature on these kind
of regimes is still not settled and there is confusion about the defining features of this concept and
its empirical referents: for example, it is not clear if illiberal democracies should be included in this
broad category. Moreover, other hybrid regime types are either rare or poorly operationalized. On
the contrary, CA is based on a well-grounded conceptual structure and provides a detailed list of
over three-dozen indicators, making it easier to identify legacies. The number of cases analysed
(thirty-five) and the emergence of new cases in Latin America (Levitsky and Loxton 2013), Africa
(Bogaards and Elischer 2016), and the Turkish case (Esen and Gümüşçü 2016; Castaldo 2018b)
demonstrate the growing relevance of CAs. There is a list of successful democratizations so that the
population of this research is clearly identifiable. Finally, here is present a rare hypothesis to deal
with regarding the impact of CA legacies on successor regimes.
To isolate the legacies more related to the CA model, we present now its defining features. Levitsky
and Way (2010) evaluate CAs along three dimensions: elections, civil liberties, and the playing field. In
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the former, major opposition candidates are rarely excluded, opposition parties can campaign publicly,
and there is no massive electoral fraud. However, manipulation of voter lists, falsification of results and
intimidation of oppositions are not unusual. CAs formally guarantee and partially respect civil liberties.
However, all government critics may be harassed through surveillance and blackmail, ‘legal’ persecu-
tion for defamation or corruption, and occasional arrest or exile. Finally, CAs show an uneven playing
field. Incumbents politicize state institutions (i.e. judiciary, security forces) and deploy them against
opponents. The government’ abuses of state institutions generates a resource disparity so severe as to
hinder the opposition’s capacity to compete on equal footing. CAs also control the media to limit
oppositions’ access to voters and weaken their political campaigns (Ibid.).
On the grounds of this description, we can isolate, deductively, the legacies that CAs may
transfer to successor democracies. According to L&W, the core of this model is unfair competition,
determined by the incumbent’s abuse of state powers, which allows the rulers to gain a significant
advantage vis-à-vis the oppositions (Ibid.). These kinds of abuses materialize in a specific mode of
governance, characterized by the forms of electoral manipulation, violation of civil liberties and
strategies intended to skew the playing field adopted by former CAs. To be clear, we do not claim
that this mode of governance is exclusive of CA regimes since their hybrid nature makes them
share many features with other regime types. However, we do claim that the presence of the
features characteristic of this mode of governance in post-CA democracies is directly linked to, and
greatly influenced by, previous CAs.
We now turn to the hypothesis regarding CA legacies that L&W introduce at the end of their book
published in 2010. In this masterpiece, they present the ultimate version of their general theory, which
includes the defining features of CA regimes, the linkage and leverage theory regarding the role played
by the international dimension in democratization processes, and the framework explaining why CA
regimes emerged in the 1990s democratized in the following decade or became stable or unstable CAs.
In their final chapter, L&W focused also on CA legacies, proposing the hypothesis according to which
the organizational power of the incumbent is the main factor explaining their strength and impact on
regime outcomes. In what follows, we partly challenge partly specify this hypothesis. On one hand, we
claim that the factor they select is an insufficient predictor of legacies’ strength and direction of
influence. Then, we provide an alternative set of factors that is better equipped to explain the degree
of influence CA legacies have on successor democracies. On the other hand, we try to specify L&W’s
hypothesis going beyond their distinction between democratic/non democratic (CA or fully author-
itarian) regime outcomes: basically, we add the QoD to the equation, claiming that even in those cases
where they should be less relevant according to L&W (hard-door transitions), CA legacies matter and
contribute to the establishment of low-quality democracies.
Regarding the determinants of the strength of CA legacies, L&W elaborate the distinction
between rotten-door and hard-door transitions. In the former, the low organizational power of
the incumbent allows even weak oppositions to trigger regime change. However, democratization
is complex due to: (a) extreme state weakness; (b) unfavourable power distribution as a result of
missing counterweights to state power: civil society is weak as well as political oppositions because
of the likely disintegration of former ruling parties; (c) little elite turnover: political oppositions are
colonized by experts in authoritarian politics coming from CAs; (d) small institutional change with
much of the former regime structures left intact ‘including weak and corrupt electoral and judicial
authorities, state monopolies on the electronic media, politicized bureaucracies and security
agencies, and repressive libel and/or internal security laws’ (Levitsky and Way 2010, 355).
A high organizational power of the incumbent leads to a hard-door transition. Strong regimes
may endure even against robust oppositions. If the latter succeed, democratization is expected
thanks to: (a) state effectiveness; (b) favourable power distribution: civil societies are robust and
political oppositions are strengthened by the survival of former ruling parties; (c) extensive elite
turnover: since defections from the former elite are less probable, regime outsiders will be in
charge of the new government, disrupting old corruption and patronage networks; (d) robust
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institutional change: strong ruling parties, believing to be viable even after the transition, adopt
reforms that level the playing field (Ibid.).
In our opinion, there are several possible flaws in L&W’s argument. For example, as sug-
gested by a recent study (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018) the survival of former ruling parties
constitutes an asset for high-quality democracies only if their change is genuine, otherwise they
will represent carriers of potentially negative legacies. Moreover, an extensive elite turnover will
be achieved mainly at the executive level, because the survival of former ruling parties will
guarantee the continuity of most of CA political elites. Hence, the state’s effectiveness, intended
as a democratic precondition that is not directly related to the CA regime, may be the only
factor highlighted by L&W that plays a role in explaining differences between hard- and rotten-
door transition outcomes.
Building on the literature on authoritarian legacies a different set of factors accounting for the
strength of CA legacies is adopted:
● durability;
● innovative capacity;
● type of transition;
● influence of the international dimension (Hite and Morlino 2004; Grilli di Cortona 2011).
Durability is related to the span of time of the previous regime. The more an autocracy lasts the
more it can affect society, politics and the state, raising the chances to hand down stronger
legacies to new democracies. A few years correspond to a brief duration (i.e. Greece), while long-
lasting regimes are those that lasted for a generation (15–20 years) or more; those in the middle
are classified as regimes of medium duration (Ibid.). Although hybrid regimes are a recent phe-
nomenon, enough time has passed to have a fair variance on this factor.
The innovation capacity relates to the degree of transformation and stabilization of institution,
norms, praxes, often symbolized by a new constitution, as well as the capacity of penetration of society
and state structures implemented by autocratic regimes. Hence, themore a regime shaped the political
reality, cancelled or modified old state structures and praxes or created new ones, and penetrated the
socio-economic dimension, the more the chances to pass on stronger legacies (Ibid.). The CA’s
innovative capacity refers mainly to the mode of governance mentioned above: the more violations
of elections, civil liberties and the level playing field a CA implements, the stronger this mode of
governance will be.1
A continuous and pacific transition led by the former elite has more chances to allow the
passing of authoritarian legacies respect to a discontinuous and traumatic transition where old
elites and institutions are wiped out (Di Cortona Pietro 2011; Hite and Morlino 2004). Here, CAs
show a more likely pattern. Since many democratic institutions and norms already exist, the
changes needed to install a democracy will be limited and the transition will likely take place
through elections, with a possible cooperation between the ruling elite and the opposition. In turn,
these processes will tend to favour continuities with the past.
Finally, the international dimension represents the fourth factor. If external actors actively
support democratization, the passing on of strong legacies may be less likely (Di Cortona Pietro
2011). For example, the EU conditionality that was applied on Eastern European countries influ-
enced the way they dealt with previous regime legacies (Pop-Eleches 2007).
These variables are interconnected. First, if the innovative capacity is high, then even a short-
lived autocracy generates strong legacies, while if the former is low, a regime will need to last
longer to have an impact. Second, a continuous transition enhances the relevance of the regime
innovative capacity, while a discontinuous transition reduces it (Hite and Morlino 2004). Finally, if
external actors actively support democratization then the other three variables have a weaker
impact on the strength of authoritarian legacies.
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While these factors are related to the capacity of influence of CA legacies, they do not say much
about the mechanisms of transmission through which these legacies are passed on to successor
regimes. In this regard, the path dependence literature may be helpful when it tries to explain
continuities and discontinuities in political phenomena. When institutions, norms, and praxes have
been institutionalized, they are resistant to change and actors tend to adapt and behave accordingly.
Hence, actors’ choices are constrained by decisions and structures established in the past (Pierson and
Skocpol 2002). For example, the lack of a constitutional reform will leave a number of authoritarian
institutions fully operational in the new democracy. A different perspective states that past events can
push relevant actors to move in exactly the opposite direction, establishing discontinuities with the
past2 (Pierson 2000): in this case, political learning processes represent crucial transmission mechan-
isms. It is also important to underline that key elites and institutions, like former ruling parties (Loxton
and Mainwaring 2018) or functional elites, may act as effective ‘carriers’ of values, norms, and praxes
when they represent direct continuities with the past (Huntington 1991). For example, if judges hired
and socialized during CAs keep their position in successor regimes they may represent carriers of
undemocratic praxes like discrimination against minorities, political oppositions, journalists, etc. which
will impact negatively on the democratic rule of law. Paradoxically, even former oppositions may
constitute important carriers of this mode of governance, since they could have been socialized with
authoritarian praxes and resort to some of them once in power.
With regard to the second part of our discussion of L&W’s hypothesis, which is related to the
impact of CA legacies on regime outcomes, these authors basically refer to a binary distinction
between democratic/non democratic (CA or fully authoritarian) regimes: due to the passing of
strong CA legacies rotten-door transitions will more likely lead to non-democratic outcomes
while in hard-door transitions legacies of former CAs will have no impact favouring the
establishment of stable democracies. Our aim here is to add nuances to this thesis, claiming
that if we disentangle the concept of stable democracy through the adoption of the QoD
framework (a regime exhibits democratic features to a greater or lesser extent) we may find out
that CA legacies are not irrelevant even in hard-door transitions. Hence, for this purpose we
adopt Morlino’s definition of QoD (2010), which identifies eight dimensions of this concept: five
procedural (rule of law, electoral accountability, inter-institutional accountability, participation,
and competition); two referred to content (freedom and equality) and one to result (respon-
siveness). However, past authoritarian legacies do not have the same influence on all these
dimensions: for example, in South European cases only four out of eight QoD dimensions were
affected (Morlino 2010). The same is true here. If we consider the specific CA mode of
governance, which regards peculiar violations of elections, civil liberties and the playing field,
the following can be identified as the empirical sectors that are more probably affected:
elections, media, judiciary, public administration, and corruption. Consequently, CA legacies
will be more likely in the following QoD dimensions: rule of law, inter-institutional account-
ability, competition, electoral accountability, and freedom (Table 1).
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To detect the impact of CA legacies on the QoD, the following three-step research strategy is
applied. First, the CA regime will be analysed, focusing on its duration and the innovative capacity
in the key dimensions of elections, civil liberties and the playing field. The peculiar aspects of the
CA mode of governance, which may be transferred to successor democracies, will be emphasized.
Then, the continuous/discontinuous nature of the transition will be detected. Finally, the analysis of
the post-transition phase will be centred on the aforementioned sectors more connected with the
key CA dimensions (Table 1). In each of them, we evaluate continuities linked to the CA mode of
governance, the transmission mechanisms that favoured those continuities and their impact on the
related QoD dimensions. Because of its relevance (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018), the former ruling
party is also analysed. The role of the international dimension in the post-transition phase will be
emphasized.
The level of democracy in the sectors where CAs have a greater impact will be measured
through the Nation in Transit (NIT) Democracy Index, which runs from 1 (most democratic) to 7
(least democratic) and attempts to capture the quality of democracy evaluating several dimensions
(Table 1).
The empirical analysis will focus on the Croatian case. In Figure 1, CA cases that democratized by
2008 are reported.3 Since the focus here is on the QoD, the more demanding V-DEM Liberal
Democracy Index has been used: 0.5 represents the liberal democracy threshold. The Nordic States
value constitutes the benchmark for a high-quality democracy. As the figure shows, none of the
post-CA cases reached high levels of democratic quality; however, Croatia emerges as one of the
best performers. According to L&W, Croatia should be among the least affected by CA legacies
since it was characterized by a medium-high organizational power of the incumbent and went
through a hard-door transition. Moreover, it was intensely linked to the West and constantly
targeted by the EU conditionality. Finally, Croatian CA represents a departure from the previous
communist regime, making easier to disentangle CA legacies from communist and historical
legacies. In conclusion, all these factors make Croatia an almost perfect example of crucial case: if
CA legacies and their influence on the QoD can be detected in this case then these outcomes may
be even more likely in other less favourable post-CA democracies.
Tuđman’s competitive authoritarian regime: durability and mode of governance
Throughout the 1990s, Tuđman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) dominated Croatian
politics. War and ethnic conflicts created permissive conditions for the emergence of the CA
(Levitsky and Way 2010). According to L&W the organizational power of the HDZ regime was
medium-high (Ibid.).
During these years, election unfairness was evident due to the instrumentalization of electoral
regulations, which were changed before every competition (Kearns 1998; Kasapović 2008).
Moreover, electoral manipulations were not unusual: outdated voter registers, intimidation at
polling stations, governmental control over the electoral commission, etc. (Čular 2000).
With regard to civil liberties, the harassment of media, NGOs and political oppositions was not rare.
The Croatian government interfered with the work of both editors and journalists (Lani and Cupi 2002).
In fact, the Agency for Reconstructing and Development had the goal of reorganizing – even making
use of purges – the entire media sector that, in Tuđman’s opinion, was still too influenced by the past
communist era. Broadcasting licenses were allocated by a packed Committee of Telecommunications.
Press printing and distributionwere provided by twomonopolistic state agencies which granted worse
conditions to opposition publications (Nizich, Markić, and Laber 1995). The government hampered the
circulation of free information by retaining the ownership of the sole Croatian news agency, Hina, and
keeping in place libel laws; in 1999 there were six hundred civil-libel suits andmore than three hundred
criminal-defamation prosecutions (Committee to Protect Journalists 2000). To keep NGOs under
control, the Law on Association – approved in 1997 – attributed supervisory and punitive powers to
the government, and increased taxation on financial contributions to NGOs (Nations in Transit (NIT)
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1998; Pusić 1998). The harassment of political oppositions was carried out through intimidations, secret
services infiltrations and violent actions, such as what occurred to the 1997 presidential candidate
Gotovac (OSCE 1997).
During the 1990s, the playing field was unbalanced in Tuđman’s favour. The state politiciza-
tion was consistent because of widespread practices of cronyism and nepotism. In the first half
of 1990s, mass dismissals of public servants and new appointments were implemented on the
basis of ethnic identity and party loyalty (Bejaković 2002; Malenica 2005). The HDZ abused state
resources, heavily contributed to make corruption widespread, and used insider privatization to
dominate access to private-sector finance. The domination of Tuđman’s culture of illegality
generated a fertile ground for the spread of corruption (Ramet 2010; Nations in Transit (NIT)
1998). Privatizations contributed the most to the unbalanced access to resources because they
were managed through the state-run Privatization Fund and favoured businessmen close to the
regime (Ramet 2010; Kearns 1998; Bićanić 1993). Tuđman’s goal was to create a nouveau riche
stratum of two hundred families who would assume ownership of a large portion of the
country’s economy (Ramet 2011), thanks to their personal connections with the leader and in
exchange of financial and political support for the HDZ. With regard to access to media,
national radio and television stations were controlled by the government and biased in its
favour. The Croatian Radio-Television (HRT) was controlled due to the appointment procedures
of its board of directors, which was selected by the parliament (Nations in Transit (NIT) 1998),
and many private television stations were run by HDZ allies (Fisher 2006). During electoral
campaigns, public media eclipsed opposition parties allotting them only insignificant space.4
Access to the law was clearly unbalanced. At the beginning of the 1990s, Tuđman dismissed
numerous judges of the communist era (1,300), replacing them with inexperienced but loyal
personnel. Moreover, the selection of members for the High Judicial Council, which appointed
all judges, was heavily politicized: while, formally, the selection procedure involved the
Parliament and other institutions, in 1994 the thirteen members were selected by an informal
committee set up by Tuđman (Dolenec 2013).
The aforementioned characteristics underline a consistent concentration of power, evident if the
role played by para-institutional committees is considered. Tuđman established many such bodies,
which were used to bypass parliament, emasculate the executive and concentrate power in his
hands and those of his allies (Kasapović 2008). Hence, institutional accountability was absent and
political power was informalised and personalized, with important decisions taken in ‘informal
party coteries’ (Kasapović 2008, 61).
In conclusion, the Tuđman regime was medium in term of duration, having lasted for a decade
during the 1990s. Moreover, it established new relevant institutions, norms and above all praxes,
which coagulated in a peculiar mode of governance able to impose important shortcomings in two
out of four indicators related to ‘elections’ and ‘civil liberties’ and in all three indicators included in
the ‘level playing field’ dimension (Levitsky and Way 2010, 369); its innovative capacity is then
evaluated as medium-high.
Democratic transition: between continuity and change
At the end of the 1990s, the interaction among the extended decline of the regime’s legitimacy,
the disunity and fragmentation of the HDZ due to the worsening of Tuđman’s physical conditions,
and the support of the international dimension pushed oppositions to unify establishing the
Šestorka alliance, which cooperated with the ruling party in order to formulate a new electoral
law (Nations in Transit (NIT) 1998). The opposition victory in the free and fair 2000 parliamentary
and presidential elections propelled the end of the Croatian CA. Despite opposition involvement,
the regime controlled the transition, facilitating continuities in personnel, institutions and praxes.
Notwithstanding the Šestorka internal fragmentation, and the resistance to change of former CA
elites and institutions, which prevented the adoption of a brand new constitution, the ‘January
8 A. CASTALDO AND A. PINNA
government’ reforms established a democracy in Croatia, and even the electoral victory of the
former ruling party in 2003 did not overturn this result; in fact, full EU membership was granted to
Croatia in 2013.
Post-transition phase: quality of democracy and competitive authoritarian legacies
Media
The 2000 elections marked the beginning of significant improvements in media freedom. Thanks to
the Law on HRT and the amendments to the Law on Telecommunications passed in 2001, hard-line
HRT directors were replaced, marking a positive discontinuity related to the media elite. Moreover,
the HRT’s third channel was privatized (Freedom of the Press, FoP, 2002; European Commission, EC
2004). Despite that, some forms of political control on the HRT governing body were still present in
the legislative framework, and a number of legal, political and economic obstacles still hampered
private broadcasters (EC 2002). Although a variety of newspapers, radio and television broadcasters
existed, the media were still afflicted by several CA legacies: intolerance and hate speech were still
present (Peruško 2007); authorities occasionally resorted to censorship (FoP 2003); journalists
continued to be exposed to threats and violence (FoP 2004); and journalists lacked professional
standards and training (European Commission (EC) 2002).
According to the Croatian Journalist Association and Reports without Borders, since the HDZ took
office in 2003 the legal framework worsened, political interference increased, and cases of intimida-
tion and physical violence raised (FoP 2005). The 2004 Law on Media, which stipulated the obligatory
revelation of sources when public interest was in danger, was ambiguously defined so that abuses
heavily affected investigative journalism. According to the law, libel remained a crime as during the
1990s (NIT 2005). Political interference on media was still present at the end of the 2000s insofar as
the appointment procedure of the HRT board was, as in the Tuđman regime, not transparent and
many small broadcasters were owned by local governments (FoP 2008). Journalists covering Balkan
wars, organized crime, corruption and economic scandals were vulnerable to political pressure,
censorship and violence (FoP 2009). The 2013 criminal code prescribes substantial fines for ‘shaming’
and ‘insult,’ recalling the treatment suffered by journalists during the Tuđman era (NIT 2015). The EU
conditionality on this sector was comparatively weak while some positive democracy assistance
actions have been implemented by the US (EUR/ACE 2001). Although positive, international support
did not produce significant improvements in this sector.
Judicial system
In 2000, many shortcomings inherited from the CA were present: political influence over the
judiciary, inefficient organization of courts, large backlog of cases, and lack of qualified staff.
A reorganization of the sector was in the opposition’s pre-electoral program. However, once in
office the Šestorka faced several difficulties that delayed the adoption of a reform strategy and its
operational plan until, respectively, 2002 and 2003 (EC 2004). As Malenica (2005) asserted, the weak
Croatian judicial system did not improve because the governmental attitude toward the reform
was indecisive and compromised instead of resolute and penetrating. The new government
abandoned its purpose of renovating judicial personnel, allowing those appointed during the CA
to keep their positions (Ibid.). Moreover, in 2004 a scandal implicating the HDZ Justice Minister
unveiled the praxis inherited from the CA to hire court apprentices according to party connections
(NIT 2005). Hence, former political and functional elites survived to the transition acted as crucial
mechanisms of transmission of praxes adopted during the 1990s, which affected negatively the
democratic rule of law and the overall QoD level.
While all problems have been addressed through the adoption of many reforms of the sector,
only some of them have been at least partially solved (Castaldo and Pinna 2017). Despite some
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advances guaranteed by new appointment procedures and disciplinary proceedings, the judiciary
is still subject to political interference and informal and corrupt networks set up in the 1990s are
not sufficiently dismantled. The Glavaš trial represents a good example. As soon as he left the HDZ
in 2005, he was investigated for the killings of Serbian civilians in Osijek dating back to 1991 and
was sentenced to ten years in prison in 2009: the timing suggests that the State Prosecution Office
may have been influenced by the government (Dolenec 2013).
The EU devoted great attention to this sector, asking for the adoption and implementation of
a reform regulating reorganization of the court system, training of judges and prosecutors, full
execution of court rulings and the reduction of backlog of cases. Despite positive compliance with
EU demands, significant challenges remain: problems of court decisions enforcement, survival of
corruptive praxes, and insufficient judiciary independence from political power (NIT 2016).
Public administration
Even after the transition, Croatian public administration was still cumbersome, politicized, inefficient
and vulnerable to corruption (NIT 2005). The lack of professionalism was certainly a legacy of the
Tuđman regime because after the 1992–1993 purges, the personnel were appointed according to
political and nepotistic criteria (Malenica 2005). Brussels conditioned EU integration to the adoption of
new measures on recruitment, promotion and training of personnel. In 2001, the Račan government
adopted the Law on Civil Servants and Public Employees, but the measure was too vague with respect
to recruitment and promotion criteria (EC 2004). In 2005, the parliament adopted the Law on Civil
Service and the Decentralization Program and in 2008–2009, the State Administration Reform Strategy
(2008–2011) (EC 2005, 2009). The new provisions represented a step forward in strengthening the
sector, but many shortcomings are still present because of a piecemeal implementation of reforms: lack
of meritocracy, high politicization, weak decentralization, inadequate anticorruption measures and
unsatisfactory employment of national minorities (EC 2007, 2012).
With respect to the military and security forces, most of the problems that emerged since 2003
were related to the intelligence service. In 2003–2004, the Counter Intelligence Agency violated the
individual freedom of some journalists, as used to do during the 1990s. Hence, according to the new
provisions adopted in 2006 the intelligence activities were put under the control of the parliament
and other two ad hoc civilian bodies (EC 2006). Despite the improvements, security services continue
to violate intermittently individual privacy rights for political purposes, as they have done during
Tuđman’s regime (NIT 2008, 2015; EC 2009).
Corruption
During the 1990s, corruption helped the HDZ to skew the playing field in its favour. In 2001, the
January government established two anticorruption bodies: a financial police unit and an auton-
omous prosecution service within the state’s attorney office (USKOK) (NIT 2001; European
Commission (EC) 2002). However, these bodies were not adequately staffed and financed (EC
2003). In March 2002, the parliament adopted the National Program for Fighting Corruption, but
its nature was mostly normative. Furthermore, Croatia ratified international agreements and con-
ventions on corruption. Despite the improvements adopted in the following years, as the 2008
Public Procurement Law, the results have been disappointing (Transparency International 2006; EC
2006, 2007, 2008; NIT, 2016).
The HDZ victory in the 2003 elections may have favoured the continuity of corruptive praxes and
networks established during the CA.5 According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development’s 2005 Transition Report, Croatian level of corruption in 2005 was higher than in 2002.
During the 2000s most of the efforts to fight corruption have targeted, with few exceptions (Ramet
2010; NIT 2010), mid- and low-level actors. The climax was reached in 2011 when former PrimeMinister
Sanader was sentenced to ten years in prison for accepting a bribe of five million Euro (NIT 2013;
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Castaldo and Pinna 2017). A number of investigations of executives of state enterprises and the
Customs Administration anticipated this trial: public prosecutors suspected that Sanader favoured
them in business deals with the government in exchange for illegal funds for him and the HDZ
(Dolenec 2013). Moreover, just five weeks before the 2011 elections, USKOK began investigating
HDZ’s ‘black funds’, which were profits accumulated illegally through fixed public tenders with party
or government-affiliated companies and then used in party-related activities (NIT 2012). These events
underline the existence of a para-institutional network of power relations infused with corruption and
crime that penetrated diverse aspects of state and society and constitute evidence that corruptive
networks and praxes of the 1990s remained present in the 2000s, representing a striking example of
a CA legacy undermining the Croatian QoD.6
Despite the recent achievements, including the indictment of Zagreb mayor Bandic in 2014,
presently corruption is still widespread. Moreover, it seems that the pace of anticorruption efforts
has slowed since Croatia’s successful EU accession (NIT 2015): all anti-corruption reforms were
stimulated by the need to comply with EU requests. Recent developments confirm this statement:
Sanader was released in 2015 after the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court overturned his
conviction on procedural grounds (NIT 2016).
Former ruling party
The HDZ’s survival after the transition represents a crucial CA legacy both at the elite and
institutional level. Most of the CA national and local elites remained in politics, constituting
a relevant continuity with the past. For example, Prime Minister Sanader held the position of
HDZ MP from 1992 and vice-minister of foreign affairs in 1993–1995 and 1996–2000; Prime Minister
Kosor was HDZ MP from 1995, vice-president of the parliament in 1995–2000 and vice-president of
the HDZ in 1995–1997 and 2002–2009.
As a former CA institution, after the 2000 elections the HDZ was overcome by many internal
transformations and splits (NIT 2002). Initially, the HDZ kept its authoritarian attitude, hindering the
Račan government’s reformatory efforts through both obstructionism in parliament and the
opposition of party members occupying key positions in the judiciary, state media and local
agencies. In 2002, HDZ President Sanader reformed the party, supporting a moderate conservative
and pro-European orientation (NIT 2003). These changes were crucial in order to keep Croatia
above the democratic threshold, since the renewed HDZ ruled the country in 2003–2011, and came
back to power in 2016. However, these reforms did not touch many informal praxes that, as has
emerged so far, had a negative influence over many sectors of the Croatian democracy. A reformed
but not completely changed HDZ represented an effective transmission mechanism of formal and
informal norms, praxes, values and institutions established during the 1990s, which survived the
transition and had a negative influence on the Croatian QoD.
Elections
Since 2000, elections in Croatia have been evaluated as free and fair. However, some minor
shortcomings have been underlined by domestic and international observers. After the 2003
parliamentary elections, OSCE did voice serious concerns about the country’s legislative framework
for elections and the absence of a permanent electoral administration (OSCE 2003). While the 2005
presidential elections were considered free and fair (NIT 2006; GONG 2005), some shortcomings
were noticed and in order to solve them the NGO Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections (GONG)
(2005) advised the establishment of a permanent and independent State Electoral Commission
(SEC), the creation of a central voter register and the adoption of a new law regulating party
funding. The government complied with the first recommendation in 2006 and with the other two
issues in 2007 (EC 2006, 2007). Overall, the successive parliamentary (2007, 2011, 2015, 2016) and
presidential elections (2010, 2014–2015) complied with democratic standards. However, both
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domestic and international observers expressed concerns about irregular party campaign finan-
cing, SEC’s insufficient sanctioning powers, the unbalance of voters in electoral units, and the
updating of voter registration lists (GONG 2007, 2010; OSCE 2008, 2010; NIT 2012, 2016). Despite
the aforementioned problems, some of which have been solved during the last years, elections in
Croatia allowed for the peaceful alternation in power in 2003, 2011 and 2016. Hence, two key
points can be underlined: the presence of CA legacies in this crucial sector have been marginal
because of the extensive scrutiny exercised by both national and international actors (GONG, OSCE,
EU, etc.); the negative effects of CA legacies found in other sectors was not so severe as to impede
or hinder dramatically a free and fair competition.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to approach an increasingly relevant gap in the literature regarding the
role hybrid regime (CA) legacies may have in democratization processes. Thanks to the analysis of
the Croatian crucial case we enriched L&W’s hypothesis, demonstrating that if the QoD is con-
sidered CA legacies matter and play a relevant role even in hard-door transition cases. In fact,
despite the medium-high organizational power of the Croatian CA regime and the hard-door
transition, just a ‘semi-consolidated democracy’ or low-quality democracy was established in
Croatia since 2000, and stabilized it in the following years (Figure 2).
The empirical analysis demonstrated that many shortcomings that contributed to lower the QoD
level in post-CA Croatia represented CA legacies that could be traced back to some of the
distinctive features of the mode of governance consolidated during the Tuđman’s regime. This
finding emerges also in the disaggregated NIT index presented in Figure 3. The worst components
(Independent Media, Corruption and Judicial Framework) are those where CA legacies had
a greater impact: with scores constantly above the 4.00 threshold, these sectors go beyond even
the Semi-Consolidated Democracy type, falling within the Transitional and Hybrid Regime class.
The new set of factors (durability, innovative capacity, type of transition, and international
dimension), and the interactions among them, performed well in explaining the strength of CA
legacies and their consequent impact on the Croatian QoD. The just mentioned outcomes were
favoured by the prevailing continuous nature of the transition. In fact, the process leading to the
electoral transition was completely managed by the ruling party. Moreover, the weakness of the
new ruling coalition and the strong opposition of a still unreformed former ruling party prevented








Figure 2. NIT Democracy Index (aggregated), Croatia (1999–2018).
Source: Freedom House, Nation in Transit (NIT) reports 1999–2018
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example, at the normative level since a new constitution was never adopted, leaving in place
important CA norms. Moreover, potential carriers of CA formal and informal legacies were abun-
dant after the transition, representing other crucial mechanisms of transmission of CA legacies:
beyond the former ruling party, which was again in power in 2003–2011 and after 2016, most of
the functional elites hired during the 1990s kept their positions, resisted the implementation of
some democratic reforms and perpetuated old praxes.
All of these factors, favouring continuities with the past, allowed for many relevant innovations
implemented by the former regime to survive the transition despite the CA regime lasting only ten
years. The empirical analysis of post-transition Croatia exposed the peculiar features of a mode of
governance inherited from the former CA regime, which consisted of recurring examples of
incumbents showing intolerance for criticism coming from independent government bodies,
opposition parties, independent media, and NGOs, as well as attempts to get a competitive
advantage through the politicization of the state, the use of corruptive practices and the pressures
on judiciaries and public media to adopt a prone position vis-à-vis the political power. Surviving
multiple changes of government, it is possible to assume that this mode of governance became
a consolidated feature of the new political system.
The role played by the international dimension helped counterbalance the combined effect of
the innovative capacity of the former CA regime and the prevailing continuous nature of the
transition. For instance, the EU was the main driver for change and partial moderation of the
former ruling party, which played a crucial role in keeping Croatia above the democratic threshold
as it ruled the country in the formative years of the new Croatian democracy. Second, the
scrupulous supervision of the electoral process by international actors (EU and OSCE) strategically
contributed in keeping elections sufficiently free and fair, as demonstrated by the NIT election
component, which is the second best performer in Figure 3. Third, the constant scrutiny and push
for reforms in the other sectors during the accession process contributed to moderate the impact
of many relevant CA legacies, despite that in some sectors the outcomes were mixed.7
A number of final considerations emerges from the analysis of the Croatian case. In a recent essay,
Nency Bermeo (2016) stressed the recent diffusion of softer and gradual forms of democratic back-
sliding, which led to the rise of more moderate autocracies in which democratic ideas and institutions
(i.e. elections, parties, legislatures, etc.) would persist and bring about change if the incentive structure






























































































Figure 3. NIT Democracy Index (disaggregated), Croatia (1999–2018).
Source: Freedom House, Nation in Transit reports 1999–2018
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follows: moderate forms of transition will allow legacies of the previous democratic regime to persist
and hinder the consolidation and strengthening of the new autocracy; a new set of conditions could
favour a re-democratization process. The Croatian case followed the same logic, although in the
opposite direction: a continuous transition from a moderate authoritarian regime favoured the
transmission of CA legacies, which burdened the new democratic regime, making it a plausible
candidate for democratic backsliding if there are important changes in the conditions that triggered
the democratization process. The presence of an actual democratic backsliding in Croatia goes
beyond the aims of this paper, but we can conclude that this case support the thesis according to
which, in the last decades, there has been an increase in cases of transition, whether democratic or
authoritarian, that resulted in moderate and fragile political regimes, characterized by greater fluidity
and hybridity respect to the past, and that are incapable of consolidating the specific features of
a given regime type, strengthening the relevance hybrid regimes, defective democracies and their
legacies will acquire in the upcoming future.
Notes
1. Levitsky and Way (2010) provide these data in the appendix of their book, and in the description of each case.
2. Discontinuous legacies may strongly affect new democracies, like the denazification process in Germany after
World War II (Castaldo 2014; Castaldo and Di Sotto 2011).
3. Three cases that regressed to autocracy are not included: Nicaragua (hard-door transition) and Macedonia and
Ukraine (rotten-door transitions). The twelve remaining cases are divided as follow: Croatia, Dominican
Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan are hard-door transitions; Benin, Mali,
Peru are rotten-door cases.
4. During the 1997 presidential campaign, the main HRT evening news program, Dnievnik, devoted to Tuđman 90%
of the presidential elections’ coverage (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1997).
5. Only in 2010, the government changed the constitution in order to affirm that privatization crimes committed
during the Homeland war do not have an expiration date (NIT 2011).
6. ‘[. . .] analysts suggest that large national companies, both state-owned and semiprivate [. . .] are hiding parallel
internal networks that are [. . .] closely connected [. . .] to the government. [. . .] the general system of public
tenders remains nontransparent, noncompetitive, and awarded mostly through pre-established arrangements
and political connections’ (NIT 2008).
7. ‘[. . .], the EU has had little experience or expertise in using its leverage to bolster the rule of law and the fight
against corruption among candidate states since these anchors of competent governance are addressed only
indirectly by the existing acquis communautaire.’ (Vachudova 2014, 123).
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